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6 THE CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
STOPPING PAYMENT OF
INTEREST COUPONS
Ty 6dward M. Bullard
A corporation issuing negotiable cou-
pon bonds or other interest bearing
securities customarily appoints an invest-
ment house, bank or trust company to
act as agent for the payment of the in-
terest on the obligations upon the pre-
sentment of the coupons as they mature.
The coupons in the ordinary case are
payable to bearer and are in all respects
negotiable. Not infrequently the owner
of such a coupon loses it or it is stolen
from him or he is in some other manner
deprived of the possession of it against
his will. Thereupon he notifies the pay-
ing agent of the circumstances and re-
quests that payment of the coupon when
presented be refused. The paying agent
on receipt of this stop payment order
takes such steps as it may to insure the
detection of the coupon upon its pre-
sentment for payment. A paying agent,
for the purpose being considered, is
usually selected from the larger banking
institutions of our principal cities and
very likely will be found to be acting at
one time as fiscal agent for a great many
corporations having securities outstand-
ing. On any interest payment date an
institution so situated may be called upon
to pay out on account of coupons many
thousands of dollars. The \olume of the
business is so great that with the equip-
ment and facilities of the modern bank-
ing house it becomes impractical, if not
impossible, to inspect each coupon as it
passes over the counter to determine
whether or not it is subject to a stop
payment notice. Consequently payments
in disregard of requests that payment be
refused are common occurrences in busi-
ness and banking circles today. Obviously
the chances for a successful execution
of the stop order increase as the amount
of business of the kind on the day of
presentment is diminished. Also detec-
tion is easier if the coupon when pre-
sented is long overdue. That fact in it-
self suggests that something may be
wrong.
The immediate inquiry concerns the
liability of the paying agent to the sender
of the stop payment order for failure of
the agent to decline payment of the
coupon. It goes without saying that the
paying agent has a complete defense if
it can be shown that the one receiving
payment was a holder of the coupon in
due course or that he derived his title
through a holder in due course and in
that event the omission of the paying
agent to make any investigation of the
facts whatever does not alter the case.
We are proceeding on the assumption
that tile person presenting the coupon
was not himself entitled to payment.
Section 119-1 of the Uniform Negoti-
able Instruments Law provides: "A
negotiable instrument is discharged:-by
payment in due course by or on behalf of
the principal debtor," and by Section 88
payment in due course is defined,-
"when it is made at or after the maturity
of the in'strument to the holder thereof
in good faith and without notice that
his title is defective." Whatever may be
the applicability of certain other pro-
visions of the Negotiable Instruments
Law to corporate securities, the applica-
bility of these sections of the Act, prop-
erly construed, to negotiable bearer
coupons is hardly open to question.
Under these sections the status of the
payer in due course is acquired, with
respect to the element of good faith, in
substantially the same manner as that
in which one becomes a holder or pur-
chaser in due course. Section 52 of the
Uniform Law declares in part: "A
holder in due course is a bolder who
has taken the instrument under the fol-
lowing conditions: 3. That he took it
in good faith and for value; 4. That at
the time it was negotiated to him he had
no notice of any infirmity in the instru-
ment or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it." In fact it is immaterial
to the rightful owner of the coupon
whether the one making the alleged
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,vrongful payment be treated as a payer
)r a purchaser. The equities are the
;ame in either case. If a payment, the.ormer owner wants the money; if a
Durchase, he wants the coupon so that
.ie may himself cash it for his own use.
Section 59 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law states that every holder is
deemed prima facie to be a holder in
due course and there is abundant author-
ity for the proposition that payment to
the holder of a bearer instrument who is
himself a finder, a defrauder or a thief
effects a valid discharge of the instru-
ment, provided, that the payer at the
time of payment had no notice of the
former holder's equities.' The rule is
the same if the payer has but a mere
suspicion of the true state of things;2
but if the payer is definitely informed of
the facts by virtue of the receipt of a
stop payment order payment thereafter
without investigation into the holder's
title is considered to have been made in
bad faith. The instrument under the
circumstances is not discharged and the
rightful owner can demand a second
payment.
8
In the case of Bainbridge v. City of
Louisville, s the City under legislative
authority had issued its bonds payable
to bearer with interest coupons at-
tached. The bonds were placed upon
the market and Bainbridge, the father
of the appellant, purchased some of the
bonds and deposited them for safekeep-
ing in the vaults of the First National
Bank of Baltimore. Thereafter the bank
was entered by burglars and all the
bonds so deposited, together with many
other securities, were stolen. A list of
the bonds, with a full description of
their character, in the form of a circular,
was sent to all the principal cities in the
country, as well as the leading banking
institutions, and every possible step was
taken to prevent the purchase of the
bonds from the thieves. Notice was also
given to the City of Louisville and to
the Bank of America, its fiscal agent in
New York. They were notified not to
pay the bonds or coupons to any one but
1 Yates v. Valentine. 71 Ill. 643; Alexander
v. Horner, 1 Fed. Cases, .36 ; No. American
Neu-chatl Rock Paving Co. v. Dist. of Col.,
16 Ct. of Appls. 593; Alexander v. Robbins.
84 Mo. 657: American Agricultural Chemical
Co. v. Graham. 9 Ga. Appls. 479 ; 71 q. E. 761 ;
Drinkall v. Movius State Bank, ll N. D. 10;
88 N. W. 724.
2 Stoddard v. Burton, 41 Ia. 582; Cothran,
the appellant. The City proceeded to
pay these coupons to the parties present-
ing them, some before they were due
and others after maturity. This action
was instituted to recover payment
against the City, and in holding the City
liable the court said:
"It is a reasonable rule, we think, and
one that may be regarded as settled, that
when the theft has been shown, the pre-
sumption is that the paper is 'till in the
possession of the thief, and a subsequent
holder, other than the original owner,
wten he demands payment, should be re-
quired by the maker, before payment, to
show that he is in good faith entitled to
the money. This rule, of course, applies
where the maker of the paper has actual
notice of the loss.
The universal doctrine of the text-books
on the subject is, that the maker is liable
to the owner of the paper after notice of
the loss, if he pays the money on the
paper to another without requiring the
latter to establish a clear title in the
event it subsequently appears that he was
without title.
While the rule requiring such inquiry
may work some inconvenience to the
maker of the paper, still it is better that
he should suffer this temporary annoy-
ance than to deny the real owner all
remedy when be has lost the evidence of
the indebtedness, and for no other reason
than that the paper lost is a negotiable
instrument. * *
It was incumbent on the city of Louis-
ville in this case, having had undoubted
evidence or notice of the loss of this
paper, to show, when payment had been,
made after the loss and notice thereof,
that the holders were purchasers in good
faith before maturity and for value.
The mere belief that the party present-
Ing the paper was an innocent holder is
not sufficient. The notice of the loss
placed the city upon inquiry, and as to
those coupons paid, a perfect title in the
holder must be shown. The fact that the
law may presume the holder of such pa-
por to be a transferee for value, affords
the maker no protection when the paper
has been lost by the original owner, and
notice brought home to the maker before
payment."
Hinckley v. Union Pacific R. R. Co.,
supra,3 is a -similar case. There the
Railroad Company had issued its Sink-
ing Fund Mortgage Bonds dated Sep-
tember 1, 1873. The plaintiff purchased
a number of these bonds and placed them
in his box at the Northampton National
Bank in Massachusetts. On January 26,
1876, the bank was robbed and the plain-
tiff's bonds, among other securities, tak-
Agent, Sarah A. Collins, 29 Howard's Prac.
113.
3 Balinbridee v. City of Louisville, 83 Ky.
285: Hinckley v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 129
Mass. 52; Wheeler v. Guild. 37 Mass. 545;
Page Wocen Wire Fence Co. v. Pool, 133
Mich. 323: Drinkall v. Movius State Bank,
supra : Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 24 Miss.
145; Burke v. Moore, 10 Ind. 160.
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en. In February the plaintiff notified the
Treasurer of the Railroad Company as
follows:
"Northampton, Mass., Feb. 26, 1876.
E. H. Rollins, Esq.,
Treasurer Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
Boston.
My dear Sir:
I lost by the recent robbery of the
Northampton National Bank, $42,000 Un-
ion Pacific Railroad Sinking Fund bonds,
Nos. 5113 to 5154, inclusive. The bonds
were originally issued to me, and have
never been on the market. If you, could
stop payment of the coupons due on the
1st of March, or notify me by whom any
of such coupons are presented, I should be
exceedingly obliged to you. The Ohio and
Mississippi Railroad Company have prom-
ised Mr. Edwards, president of the Bank,
to stop payment of any of the stolen cou-
pons of their bonds whose numbers have
been given them. I shall be very thank-




This request was communicated by the
Railroad Company to the Union Trust
Company, its fiscal agent in New York.
On April 21, 1879, Kidder, Peabody &
Co., Bankers, presented to the Union
Trust Company certain of the coupons
detached from plaintiff's bonds and the
coupons were paid. Plaintiff in this ac-
tion based his declaration upon the two
coupons bearing the earliest maturity,
viz., March 1, 1876. The court gave
judgment for the plaintiff, saying in part:
"As to the time of the notice, there
can be no question that, if at the very
moment of payment the payer were re-
minded that the note which he was about
to pay had been lost or stolen, it would
be hi s duty to delay payment till the de
facto holder had established a title to the
instrument. The question before us is
whether notice previously given of the
loss of a negotiable instrument distin-
guishable by number or other ear-mark is
sufficient to fix upon the party liable to
pay a duty of inquiry, and of refusal to
pay to a holder who cannot substantiate
his title. We think that such previous
notice is sufficient. * * *
The only payment which can be a dis-
charge to the party paying is a payment
to a bona fide holder, whose title was
acquired before maturity for value, and
without notice. It may often happen
that upon inquiry the title of the de
facto holder will appear so plainly that
the party paying will take very little
risk in making the payment; but the pay-
ment of a lost negotiable instrument, after
notice, overdue, and without inquiry, is a
payment wholly at the payer's own risk."
The Attorney General of the United
States in an opinion dated December 8,
4 32 Opinions Atty. Gen. 80.
"There is another circumstance in this
case which tends to fix more clearly upon
the defendant the duty of inquiry, and
that is that the coupon was long over-
due. The maker of a coupon cannot be
exempt from the liabilities which attach
to all negotiable instruments when over-
due. It is an elementary principle of
1919, 4 advised the Secretary of the
Treasury that a United States Govern-
ment coupon bond of the First Liberty
Loan, which had been found in the post
office building in Denver by an employe
and forwarded to the Treasury Depart-
ment, should be held by the Treasury
Department until claimed by the true
owner and should not bq returned to the
finder on his request. The Attorney
General based his opinion upon the rule
of law that the maker of a negotiable
instrument is not protected if he makes
payment with knowledge of the fact that
some one else is the rightful owner of
the instrument.
Certain of the coupons paid in Bain-
bridge v. City of Louisville and also
those involved in Hinckley v. Union
Pacific R. R. Co. were long overdue.
This fact was noticed by the court in
each case, in the latter it being said with
reference to one of the coupons:
Conceding as a matter of law the lia-
bility of the payer with notice who fails
to inquire into the title of the holder
presenting the coupon, what kind and
amount of investigation is required of the
payer to afford him protection? The
language of the courts in the decided
cases indicates that the payer having no-
tice of equities acts at his peril and is
under a duty to establish conclusively
the title of the holder requesting pay-
ment. It is submitted that this is too
harsh and is opposed to sound principle.
The payer is entitled to be shielded
tinder the presumption given the holder
or purchaser by Section 59 of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law. The legal posi-
tion of the payer, therefore, must be
determined in a measure by considering
the nature of that presumption. Prima
facie the holder is deemed to be a holder
in due course; "but," in the language of
Section 59, "when it is shown that the
title of any person who has negotiated
the instrument was defective the burden
is on the holder to prove that he or
some person tinder whom he claims ac-
quired the title as holder in due
course. '" Should this be read as mean-
ing that the party desiring to establish
the holder's title then has the ultimate
burden of proving that title? Probably
not. The real burden of proof should
rather be on the contestant to establish
commercial law that negotiable paper
overdue carries with it, on its very face,
notice of defective title sufficient to put
the transferee on inquiry."
This section of the Act applies to negoti-
able corporate bonds. Irwin v. Bedford, 151
Tenn. 402; 270 5. W. 81.
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the defective title. In other words, the
presumption although expressed to he
rima faic nerely should be allowed a
persisting effect and should not be re-
garded as devitalized completely by a
prima facie rcbuttal. The terll 'burden"
then riust be interpretcd as burden of
going forward and not burden of proof.
This construction of the lresunption is
supported by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri in the interesting case of Downs v.
Hortonr and conforms to the policy of
the law favoring the free circulation of
bearer paper.7  It is believed therefore
that on principle if the paying agent af-
,ter receiving a stop paymnent notice de-
lays payment of the coupon for a rea-
sonable time and makes a fair investiga-
tion of the facts which fails affirmatively
to disclose want of good title in the
holder the agent should be protected in
paying the bearer in accordance with
the terms of the coupon. Beyond this
the duty should rest on the former hold-
er to place before the paying agent clear
evidence of the alleged defective title of
the bearer.
It will be observed that the position
of a paying agent for corporate securities
upon the receipt of a s t op payment order
is far more precarious than that of a
bank directed by one of its depositors to
.stop payment of a check. The bank, ex-
cept in the single case of certification
procured by the holder, should refuse to
honor the check no matter what the cir-
cumstances. The bank is under no con-
tractual or other obligation to the holder
to pay the check and consequently in-
curs no liability to the holder for its re-
fusal to pay. The paying agent on the
other hand, acting for the maker of the
coupon, proceeds, under the strict view,
at its peril. Refusal to pay or unreason-
able delay in paying the holder will give
rise to a contractual liability on the in-
strument itself if the holder proves to
be the one entitled to payment, whereas
neglect to observe the stop payment re-
quest may subject the payer to a liability
in the nature of tort for conversion to
the original holder if the holder request-
ing payilent proves not to bc the one
entitled to paynint.s
Negotiable bearer coupons issued in
connection w ith a series of corporate
bonds circulate much more readily and
-ire dealt in far more extensively in any
metropolitan business center than the in-
dividual obligations of private persons.
Iu this respect coupons are more nearly
assimilable to bank drafts, negotiable
certificates of deposit and even bank
notes than to the class of security repre-
sented by a nerchant's individual note
or bill. Yet whenever the question has
been raised the courts have not been dis-
posed to make any exception, based on
the nature of the instrument paid, to the
general rule of law regarding the lia-
bility of the maker with notice who pays
the instrument without examining the
holder's title. Lord Mansfield, in the
year 1758, sitting on the Court of King's
Bench, gave his now famous opinion in
the case of Miller v. Race,9 in which he
considered certain of the rights of own-
ers and payers of bank notes. He pointed
out that the negotiable characteristics of
money were not attributable to the ab-
sence of "ear marks," but to "the cur-
rency of it," and that by commercial
and business use, bank notes had be-
home currency or money notwithstand-
ing their supposed ear marks; neverthe-
less, lie said, even regarding bank notes
as money "it may be both reasonable
and customary to stay the payment till
inquiry can be made whether the bearer
of the note came by it fairly or not."
Fifty years later, in Solomons v. Bank
of England,10 counsel for plaintiff, while
not contending that the maker of ordi-
nary negotiable paper was not bound by
notice of loss, endeavored to establish a
distinction in favor of bank bills, saying:
"If once the Bank were permitted to
withhold payment upon the same grounds
as would warrant it in the case of bills
of exchange, the confidence of, foreign-
ers would be very much shaken and the
circulation of these notes greatly dimin-
ished." Lord Kenyon, C. J., speaking
for the court replied:
6287 Mo. 414; 230 S. W. 103.
7 See also Shaffer v. Bond, 129 Md., 648,
99 Atl. 973 and the authorities there cited,
where it is held that under Section 24 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law the ultimate bur-
den is on the maker of the note to prove
want of consideration, even though the prima
]aoie case given the plaintiff by this section
of the Act has been negatived.
8 In Hinckley v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., it
was stated:
"It has been argued for the defence
that the duty of the promisor in case of
the loss of a coupon is a gratuitous duty,
analogous to the liability of a gratuitous
bailec. We cannot take such a view of
this duty. It is true, as the counsel for
the defendant maintains, that the liability
does not arise from the contract, but from
the law outside of the contract; but what-
ever that liability may be, it is part of
the law which governs the issue and cir-
culation of negotiable instruments, to
which the maker of such instrument sub-
Jects himself by the very act of making,
and from which he derives the advantage
which the negotiability of his promise hif-
fords him."
9 1 Burrows 452.
10 13 East 135, Court of K. B.
10 THE CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
"It is very certain that both policy and
convenience require that Bank notes should
have the freest currency and no other
Impediment ought to be put In the way
of it than such as mere justice requires.
This is doing no more than would be the
case even upon payment of mosey Itself.
* * * There Is no doubt but the holder
of a Bank note is entitled prima focie to
prompt payment; but If another party has
been plundered of it before and has ap-
plied to the Bank, can any impropriety
be imputed to them for suspending the
payment till it Is ascertained that the
party tendering It for payment is not con-
taminated with the guilt?"
The Massachusetts Court in Hinckley
v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. cited and
discussed the foregoing case with ap-
proval.
In the Hinckley case, defendant's
counsel also argued that the volume of
business done by the Union Trust Com-
pany, the Railroad Company's paying
agent in that case, was so large that the
usual rules of liability should not apply.
To this end the following statement of
the Treasurer of the Union Trust Com-
pany was offered in evidence:
"It happens once a week, on an
average, that a person will present for
payment the coupons of a bond or of
several bonds, which coupons are overdue
for one or more years, with or without
those of intervening dates. Coupons pre-
sented after maturity are often presented
at dates concurrent with the payment of
coupons from other classes of the Com-
pany's bonds, which last are just due or
just past due. The Company pays cou-
Ions from first mortgage bonds, $27,231,
000; land grant bonds, $6,670,000; sink-
ing fund bonds, $12,455,000; Omaha
Bridge bonds, $2,104,000."
The court was of the opinion that
these were not extenuating circum-
stances:
"For a party engaged in mercantile
pursuits to keep a list of notes signed
by himself which he has been notified
have been lost or stolen, is neither im-
practicable nor burdensome, and is no more
a hardship than any other precaution
which the law merchant imposes upon
those who make use of the benefits of
negotiable paper, for the discouragement
of fraud and the protection of the pub-
lic. And the fact that an Individual or
a corporation does business on a very
large scale is far from being a reason
why such individual or corporation should
be allowed to disregard any of the obli-
gations laid upon those who Issue only
small amounts of negotiable paper. Ordi-
narily opportunities for fraud upon the
public will increase with the Increase of
the business of a great corporation, and
It Is the duty of such a ebrporation to
proviae proportionately greater means of
guarding against such fraud. If it be
necessary to engage special clerks, or to
devote extra time to applying the pre-
cautions imposed by the law merchant,
It is no hardship, but only the natural
and reasonable increase of a duty pro-
11 21 Wall. 138.
portionate to the magnitude of the *bi-
gations of such a corporatln."
In the case of Vermilye & Compmny
v. Adams Express Co.,- Vermilye &
Company, Bankers of New York, had
presented to the treasury of the United
States for payment, certain treasury
notes issued under the act of March 5,
1865. They were informed by the De-
partment that the Adams Express Com-
pany asserted ownership of the notes
and that they could not be paid until
the question of the rightful ownership
was settled. The matter resulted in a
bill of interpleader filed by the United
States. The Express Company suffered
the loss of the notes through a train rob-
bery and as soon thereafter as it could
obtain the numbers and other descrip-
tion of the stolen notes advertised dhe
loss extensively in the newspapers, gave
notice at the Treasury Department and
also notified the principal bankers and
brokers of the City of New York, in-
cluding Vermilye & Company. Sub-
sequently Vermilye & Company pur-
chased the notes then overdue at fair
prices in the regular course of business
and forwarded them to the Treasury De-
partment for redemption. On the hear-
ing Vermilye & Company introduced
several bankers and brokers as witnesses
to show that notes of this kind continued
to be bought and sold after they had
become due; that it was not customary
for dealers in government securities to
keep records or lists of the numbers or
description of bonds alleged to have been
lost, stolen or altered, or to refer to such
lists before purchasing such securities;
that in their judgment it would be im-
practicable to carry on the business of
dealing in government securities if it
were necessary to resort to such lists and
make such examination previous to pur-
chase, and that the purchase of the notes
in controversy was made in the ordinary
and usual mode in which such transac-
tions were conducted. The court af-
firmed the decree in favor of the Express
Company saying:
"We cannot agree with counsel for the
appellants that the simple fact they were
the obligatibns of the government takes
them out of the rule which subjects the
purchaser of overdue paper to an Inquiry
into the circumstances under which it
was made as regards the rights of ante-
cedent holders. * 0
Bankers, brokers and others cannot, as
was attempted in this case, establish by
proof a usage or custom in dealing in
such paper, which, in their own interest,
contravenes the established commercial
law If they have been in the habit of
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disregarding the law, this does not relieve
them from the consequences nor establish
a different law. Nor sitting here as chan-
cellors can we say that the testimony
offered of the impossibility of men in that
business bearing in mind the' notices of
loss or theft of bonds or notes well de-
scribed, with which they have been
served, satisfies us of the soundess of the
proposition. By the weltlsettled law of
the case they may purchase such paper
before due without cumbering their minds
or their offices with the memoranda of
such notices. But we apprehend that the
amount of overdue paper presented for
negotiation is not so large as that bank-
ers receiving notice of loss cannot make
or keep a book or other form of refer-
ence which will enable them with a very
little trouble to ascertain when overdue
paper is presented whether they have
been served with notice of a claim adverse
to the party presenting it.
The fact that the notes were at once
recognized at the treasury by reason of
the notices served there, proves that no
unreasonable amount of care and pru-
dence was necessary to enable bankers
and brokers to do the same.
There are other rights in cases of
overdue paper besides the right to pur-
chase it, which require that care should
be exercised, especially by parties who
have fair notice of these rights.
Bankers and brokers cannot, more
than others, when warned of possible or
probable danger in their business, shut
their eyes and plead a want of knowledge
which is willful. In this matter also
the appellants were in fault." (Italics
the writer's.)
Judging from the italicized portion of
the above quotation, the court decided
the case against Vermilye & Company,
not because they had received notice of
the loss from the Express Company, but
mainly because the purchase was after
the notes had become due. In other
words, notice of the kind there given
was not such as would have prevented
the Bankers from becoming holders in
due course had they purchased the notes
before they were overdue. If this is what
the court really intended, what would it
have said if there had been involved the
rights of a payer instead of a purchaser?
Payment in due course, unlike purchase,
results expressly by payment "at or after
maturity," and if banking houses acting
as paying agents "may," to paraphrase
the language of the court, "pay such
paper after due without cumbering their
niinds or their offices with the mem-
oranda of such notices," the makers of
corporate securities and their fiscal agents
are in a position to enjoy a very welcome
immunity from the claims of those whose
coupons have been inadvertently paid.
Unfortunately, a rather diligent search
of the authorities, both before and after
the decision of this case, has failed to
reveal "the well settled law" to which the
Court refers.
In the Vermilye case and also in the
Bainbridge and Hinckley cases it appears
that the loss of -the securities occurred
through no fault of the owner. Fre-
quently, however, the loss or theft of
coupons results from the owner's own
carelessness. V'hen his coriduct or fault
can be said to be proximately responsi-
ble for the loss his right of recovery
against the payer should, on principle, be
less clear. If the payer is liable on prin-
ciples of negligence in a capacity anal-
agous to a tort-feasor, as before sug-
gested, is there not ample warrant for
introducing in a proper case the doc-
trine of contributory negligence? The
owner of the coupons should not be able
to rid himself entirely of the conse-
quences of a loss occasioned through his
own blameworthiness simply by notify-
ing the payer of the facts, even though,
in one sense, the payer does have the
"last clear chance" of apprehending the
coupons. Thus far this phase of -the
subject seems not to have been directly
,considered by the authorities.
Under date of April 27, 1867, H. Mc-
Culloch, then Secretary of the Treasury
of the United States, published the fol-
lowing circular:
"Treasury Department, April 27, 1867.
In consequence of the increasing trouble,
wholly without practical benefit, arising
from notices which are constantly received
at the department respecting the loss of
coupon bonds which are payable to
bearer, and of treasury-notes issued and
remaining in blank at the time of loss,
it becomes necessary to give this public
notice, that the government cannot pro-
tect, and will not undertake to protect
the owners of such bonds and notes
against the consequences of their own
fault or misfortune. Hereafter all bonds,
notes and coupons, payable to bearer, and
treasury-notes issued and remaining in
blank, will be paid to the party present-
ing them in pursuance of the regulations
of the department, in the course of reg-
ular business; and no attention will be
paid to caveats which may be filed for
the purpose of preventing such payment."
In the same manner paying agents,
in response to stop payment requests,
sometimes write the owners of the lost
or stolen coupons stating that while rea-
sonable efforts will be used to prevent
the payment of the coupons on present-
ment, still if the coupons should be paid,
no liability therefor will be recognized.
It is perfectly clear that the mere for-
warding of statements of.this character
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cannot affect the legal rights or liabili-
ties of the parties. If an obligation exists
not to pay after being apprised of the
equities of the case, it cannot be avoided
in advance by a bare disclaimer. If,
however, the owner of the coupons signs
a form of agreement, as is often done,
furnished by the paying agent, contain-
ing a request that payment be stopped
and an express provision for exoneration
from responsibility in the event of neg-
lect to observe the request, different
questions arise. There a contract has
been made, the terms of which are broad
enough on their face to protect the pay-
ing agent in the event of a payment
made either unavoidably or through
negligence. What of the validity and
enforceability of such a contract? In
the absence of decisions passing on the
exact question reference perhaps is war-
ranted to the general rules governing
similar contracts entered into between
the depositor and his bank in regard to
stopping payment of the depositor's
checks. For the most part, the larger
banks of the country do not attempt to
limit their liability by contract for failure
to stop payment of checks when ordered,
treating their liability in such cases as
one of the risks incident to the carrying
on of a general banking business.
Smaller institutions, unwilling to assume
this risk, frequently do attempt to limit
their liability by stipulation or contract.
The following is a typical form of card
which the depositor is asked to sign
when he desires to stop payment on a
check which he has drawn:
"Please stop payment on check No ......
for $ .......... dated .................
drawn by me to the order of..........
.. and I hereby agree to in-
demnify the....................bank
against all loss resulting from nonpay-
ment of said check. Should you pay this
check through neglect, inadvertence, or
oversight, it is expressly understood that
you will not be held responsible or liable
therefor."
Outside of special agreement the law,
with substantial uniformity, has held the
bank to an unconditional obligation to
stop payment on checks when so ordered
by the depositor. Contracts modifying
this absolute undertaking have been up-
held insofar as they purposed to relieve
the bank from liability in case of pay-
ment notwithstanding the exercise of due
care, but have generally been held invalid
on grounds of public policy where the
intent was to discharge the bank from
liability for negligent disregard of the
stop order. In the latest decision on
the subject, however, Tremont Trust
Company v. Burback, 12 a contract ex-
empting the bank from liability for negli-
gence is clearly sustained. In that case
the depositor, desiring to stop payment
on a check drawn by him upon his ac-
count with the defendant Trust Com-
pany signed and delivered to the Trust
Company a card requesting that pay-
ment of the check when presented be
refused and expressly agreeing not to
hold the Trust Company liable on ac-
count of payment contray to the request
if payment should occur through "inad-
vertence or accident." On the reverse
side of the card it was stated that the
Trust Company received the request
upon the express condition that it would
use the best methods known to it to
prevent "oversight and accident" but
that it should not be in any way liable
for its act should the check be paid in
the course of its business. The book7
keeper of the Trust Company testified
that he made a notation of the stop order
on his book but in a manner which he
could not explain, it being the last day
of the month, and he being busy with
making up accounts, the check got
through and was debited against the de-
fendant's account. The Court, in sus-
taining defendant's exceptions taken in
the lower court, said:
"The word inadvertence In the printed
agreement embraces the effect of inatten-
tion, the result of carelessness, oversight,
mistake, or fault of negligence and the
condifion or character of being inadver-
tent, inattentive, or heedless. The word
accident is used In the sense of a hap-
pening of an event without the concur-
rence of the will of the person by whose
agency it was caused. It is manifest the
quoted words were intended to exonerate
the bank from the kind of negligence
shown by the record, and we are unable
to see anything illegal, or anything op-
posed to public policy, in a stipulation
or agreement which relieves A bank so
circumstanced from the results of the
mere inattention, carelessness, oversight-
edness, or mistakes of its employes."
No reason is apparent why the law
of this case should not apply as well to
a contract made between a paying agent
for corporate securities and the owner
of lost or stolen coupons, provided such
a contract is valid at all. The difficulty
lies in finding a, sufficient consideration
to support the promise of the owner of
the coupons. This difficulty is not pres-
ent in the case of depositor and bank.
The relationship is there essentially con-
tractual and is subject to modification
.at the will of the parties. In fact, the
12 123 N. E. 782, Supreme Judicial Court
of Mass.
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bank can refuse to take the depositor's
account in the first instance or to con-
tinue it, as the case may be, unless the
depositor agrees to hold the bank free
from liability for payment of checks, the
payment of which is ordered stopped.
Not so with the paying agent whose duty
it is to stop payment after notice, a duty
existing in law and- not by virtue of any
agreement between the parties interested.
The paying agent cannot require as a
condition to its acceptance of the stop
payment order a promise from the owner
of the coupons not to hold the agent
liable for an inadvertent payment. There-
fore, the question might be asked
whether such a promise when volun-
tarily made is founded on a sufficient
consideration. The objection is a rather
technical one and perhaps should not
prevail where the agreement between the
paying agent and the owner of the cou-
pons is freely entered into. After all,
there is a fair exchange of promises.
In the present state of the law, where
the duty of the paying agent remains
unaffected by contract, the liability for
payment after the receipt of a stop order
and without any investigation into the%
holder's title seems to be tantamount to
'absolute liability. If the courts should
at any time in the future see fit to sup-
plant this standard of absolute liability
with the time-honored though less exact
"due care under the circumstances," their
action, from the business standpoint at




Cases on Constitutional Law. James
Parker Hall. West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, 1926.
This edition includes a supplement,
bringing down to date decisions of the
Federal and State courts on constitu-
tional questions.
The supplement, four hundred pages
in length, evidences a considerable de-
velopment of Constitutional Law in that
pi riod, since 1913, the date of the last
edition.
This work, though not the school's
official case book, will be of considerable
value to the student who desires to pur-
sue this interesting subject further.
"Cases on Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure selected from decisions of the
Federal Courts. By Harold R. Medina.
West Publishing Company, St. Plaul.
Minn, 1926. pp. 674." (American Case
Book Series.)
This °collection of cases comes at an
opportune time. The expansion of the
judicial power of the federal courts dur-
ing the past quarter of a century has
made it imperative that the practitioner
have an understanding of the fundamen-
tal principles underlying the federal judi-
cial system.
The author has a wealth of material
.to choose from and has succeeded in
selecting from the vast number of avail-
able cases those which emphasize the
fundamental matters of general applica-
tion and at the same time gives a fouiida-
tion of knowledge of the practice from
the commencement of the action in the
District Court to the completion of an
appeal to the Supreme Court. This has
been accomplished in a volume of 674
pages and provides a case book not ob-
jectionable in size or cost and which can
be covered in a two hour semester course
without .being burdensome to the
student.
The appendix space provides for those
articles of the Federal Constitution which
create and limit the judicial power of
the United States and also the Federal
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The binding and the mechanics of the
work measure up to the standard set by
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The conciseness and comprehensive-
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